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Abstract
We study the problem of data release with privacy, where
data is made available with privacy guarantees while keep-
ing the usability of the data as high as possible — this is im-
portant in health-care and other domains with sensitive data.
In particular, we propose a method of masking the private
data with privacy guarantee while ensuring that a classifier
trained on the masked data is similar to the classifier trained
on the original data, to maintain usability. We analyze the
theoretical risks of the proposed method and the traditional
input perturbation method. Results show that the proposed
method achieves lower risk compared to the input perturba-
tion, especially when the number of training samples gets
large. We illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed method
of data masking for privacy-sensitive learning on 12 bench-
mark datasets.
Introduction
In domains like healthcare or finance, data can be sensi-
tive and private. There are several scenarios where a dataset
needs to be shared while protecting sensitive parts of the
data. For example, consider a medical study where a group
of patients with a particular medical condition are being
studied. The identifying data of some patients (e.g., those
with a rare disease) may need to be masked while shar-
ing their records with a wider group of medical researchers.
However, when the patient records are processed by clin-
ical decision support tools, we want the machine learning
(ML) models in the tools to have similar performance on the
masked data as they would on the original data.
Several approaches have been proposed to preserve pri-
vacy of data, e.g., by anonymization (Samarati and Sweeney
1998), by generalization (Mohammed et al. 2011). Methods
for differential-privacy include adding Laplace-noise (Sar-
wate and Chaudhuri 2013), modifying the objective (Chaud-
huri and Monteleoni 2009), and posterior sampling (Dim-
itrakakis et al. 2014; Wang, Fienberg, and Smola 2015).
Privacy-preserving data publishing transforms sensitive data
to protect it against privacy attacks while supporting ef-
fective data mining tasks (Fung et al. 2010). Differentially
private data release (Mohammed et al. 2011) presents an
anonymization algorithm that satisfies the −differential pri-
vacy model, while other methods of data release (Chen et
al. 2011; Xiao, Xiong, and Yuan 2010) group the data and
add noise to the partition counts. However, these techniques
don’t explicitly try to maintain the accuracy of a model.
Our approach masks training samples with less sensitive
ones with privacy guarantee, while ensuring that the clas-
sifier trained on the masked data reaches accuracy sim-
ilar to the classifier trained on the original data. More-
over, compared to publishing masked classifier, publishing
masked data enables other types of classifiers to be trained
by the user. There are also query-based data masking meth-
ods for a classifier, which are sparse vector techniques for
generating masked data using a query that the gradient of
the masked data is zero (Dwork, Roth, and others 2014;
Lyu, Su, and Li 2017; Lee and Clifton 2014; Blum, Ligett,
and Roth 2008). However, when the gradient computation is
complicated, designing a method to achieve a zero gradient
can be tricky.
We have three main contributions in this paper. First,
we propose a novel algorithm of data masking for privacy-
sensitive learning. Second, we provide a theoretical guaran-
tee explaining why the proposed method is more suitable
for a large number of training samples than a traditional in-
put perturbation method. Finally, we illustrate the efficacy
of our method considering logistic regression as an example
classifier, on both synthetic and 12 benchmark datasets.
Problem setting
Goal: Assume we train a model parameterized by w ∈ Rd
on a dataset Dtrain = {xi, yi}Ni=1, where xi ∈ X = Rd,
yi ∈ Y = {−1, 1}, and d is the number of features. The goal
of our data publishing algorithm A is generating a masked
training datasetDmasked = {x′i, yi}Ni=1, where x′i ∈ X, such
that: (a) Dmasked is as different as possible from Dtrain,
but (b) the model trained on Dmasked gives us parameters
w′ that are close to the original parameters w of the model
trained on Dtrain.
This paper outlines an approach for achieving this goal.
Before that, we review several concepts of data publishing
with privacy and the core formulation of logistic regression.
Data publishing with differential privacy (DPDP)
We first begin with the concept of data publishing with dif-
ferential privacy (DPDP). We consider two datasets of N
training samples, Dtrain1 = {x1i, y1i}Ni=1 and Dtrain2 =
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{x2i, y2i}Ni=1, which are different at only one sample: with-
out loss of generality, assume x1i = x2i and y1i = y2i for
i = {1, 2, . . . , N−1}, and x1N 6= x2N and (or) y1N 6= y2N .
A data publishing algorithmA is said to be -private (Dwork
2008) if
p
(
A(Dtrain1) = O
)
p(A
(
Dtrain2) = O
) < e,
whereO = {x′i, yi}Ni=1 is a particular output of the data pub-
lishing algorithm A. Intuitively, differential privacy guaran-
tees that for small , the output of A is not sensitive to the
existence of a single sample in the dataset. In this setting,
the attacker has less chance to infer details about a partic-
ular training sample in the data. In this work we focus on
differential privacy for masked data generation where the
machine learning algorithm we consider is logistic regres-
sion (Walker and Duncan 1967).
Core formulation of logistic regression
Logistic Regression: We are given a training datasetDtrain.
The goal for training a logistic regression classifier is finding
a mapping function between a sample in Rd and a label in
{1,−1}. Specifically, we model the relation among a sample
xi and its label yi as
p(yi|xi,w) = e
yiw
Txi
1 + eyiwTxi
.
Assuming samples are i.i.d., the log-likelihood for the train-
ing samples is
Lλ(w) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[(
yiw
Txi
)−log(1+eyiwTxi)]+λ ||w||2
2
,
(1)
with λ is the regularization parameter and || · || denotes the
2-norm.
Training logistic regression: In logistic regression, training
is done by finding the parameter w that maximizes the log-
likelihood in (1), i.e., the gradient of Lλ atw is 0, as follows:
∂Lλ(w)
∂w
=
1
N
[ N∑
i=1
[
yi − p(yi = 1|xi,w)
]
xi
]
+ λw = 0.
(2)
For various logistic regression optimization techniques to
make the above gradient 0, please refer to (Minka 2003).
DPDP by Masked Data Generation
In this section, we describe how to generate masked samples
for logistic regression.1
Adding Laplace noise to the classifier
Unlike previous approaches of adding noise to the data then
publishing noisy data, we consider a novel approach: we first
1In this work we consider logistic regression as the classifier.
The work flow of data publishing for other classifiers, e.g., SVM,
is similar to that of the proposed method.
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Figure 1: The work flow of the proposed method and tradi-
tional data publishing methods.
train a classifier on the original data, and then add Laplace
noise to the classifier. The motivation for adding noise is
that in differential privacy, the goal is to make similar out-
put for any two neighbor datasets D1 and D2 so that attacker
cannot infer about the existence of any single training sam-
ple. Since the classifiers trained on two datasets D1 and D2
are not equal, adding Laplace noise to the parameters of
those classifiers would account for that difference, and with
some probability those classifiers after adding noise would
be equal. Subsequently, we generate and publish a masked
dataset such that the gradient of the log-likelihood for the
noisy classifier is 0. The work flow of the proposed frame-
work is illustrated in Fig. 1(a). In comparison, the work
flow of traditional data publishing methods by perturbation
is shown in Fig. 1(b).
Generating masked data
We generate masked data O = {x′i}Ni=1 such that the gradi-
ent of the log-likelihood of O for the aforementioned noisy
classifier w′ is 0. The optimal condition for masked data is
the following:
1
N
[ N∑
i=1
[
yi − p(yi = 1|x′i,w′)
]
x′i
]
+ λw′ = 0, (3)
where the masked samples {x′i, y′i}(s) are unknown. To eval-
uate the optimality of the set S of masked samples w.r.t. w′,
we use the 2-norm of the gradient:
N (S) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ N∑
i=1
(
yi − p(yi = 1|x′i,w′)x′i
)
+Nλw′
∣∣∣∣∣∣2
We start with an initial set of training samples S then itera-
tively add new sample to S. The criteria to evaluate the new
sample is the 2-norm of the gradient of S after including the
new sample.
Algorithm 1 outlines our proposed Masked Data Genera-
tion algorithm. The algorithm terminates when the number
of samples in S reaches N .
Algorithm 1 Masked Data Generation
Input: N training samples Dtrain = {xi}Ni=1, 
Output: N masked training samples O = {x′i}Ni=1.
Step 1: Train Logistic regression classifier w, as in (2).
Step 2: Add Laplace noise to the classifier w′ = w + η,
where ||η||c∼ e−λN2 ||η||, where c is a normalized con-
stant.
Step 3: S = {∅}. Incrementally generate masked sam-
ples.
while cardinality(S) ≤ N do
Find an outliers {x′m} reducing the 2-norm of the gradient
of S the most, using Gradient Descent (5)
Add the new sample S = S
⋃{x′m}
end while
Return O = S;
Iteratively generating masked samples
In this section, we present the gradient descent method to
iteratively generate masked samples. In particular, given the
current set of masked samples S, we need to find the next
masked sample {x′m} such that the 2-norm of the gradient
of the set S
⋃{x′m} is close to 0 as possible.
For simplicity of notation, denote
∑
x′i∈S
(
yi − p(yi =
1|x′i,w)x′i
)
+Nλw = g as the current gradient of the cur-
rent masked samples. Consequently, we need to find the next
masked sample {x′m} minimizing the following objective
N (x′m) = ||
(
ym − e
ymw
Tx′m
1 + ew
Tx′m
)
x′m + g||2. (4)
To minimize (4), we use backtracking gradient descent. The
gradient is computed as
∂N (x′m)
∂x′m
= 2
((
ym − e
ymw
Tx′m
1 + ew
Tx′m
)
x′m + g
)
×
(
(ym − e
wTx′m
1 + ew
Tx′m
)I−wTx′m
ew
Tx′m
(1 + ew
Tx′m)2
)
, (5)
where I is the identity matrix in Rd×d. Note that, we can
generalize our algorithm to C classes, with C > 2, as fol-
lows
∂N
∂x′m
=
C∑
c=1
2
(
[I(ym = c)− p(ym = c|x′m,w)]x′m + gc
)
×(
[I(ym = c)− p(ym = c|x′m,w)]−
C∑
l=1
[p(ym = c|x′m,w)p(ym = l|x′m,w)(wc −wl)Tx′m)]
)
.
Computational complexity: The computational complex-
ity of the proposed algorithm is linear in term of number of
added samples.
Intuition: Most differential privacy algorithms for data
publishing modify the data by adding uniform noise, e.g.,
as in Fig. 1(b), which may change the original data manifold
closer to a uniform manifold and may not be optimized for
any particular machine learning model.
Comparison to classifier publishing: The proposed ap-
proach has an advantage over other traditional approaches.
In particular, assuming a non-empty initialized set of train-
ing samples S in Step 3 of Algorithm 1, the proposed method
adds fake samples with completely different manifold to the
dataset. For example, assume we want to preserve the pri-
vacy of a dataset consisting of non-diabetes patients and
sensitive type-1 diabetes patients. We can initially add non-
sensitive type-2 diabetes data samples, thereby preserving
the privacy of the type-1 diabetes patients. Moreover, by iter-
atively adding masked samples, a classifier that is trained on
the original data will be quite close to the classifier trained
on the new masked data. Compared to publishing the noisy
classifier as in (Chaudhuri and Monteleoni 2009), the pro-
posed data masking method allows users to benefit from real
data, i.e., in this case non-diabetes and type-2 diabetes data,
and train other types of classifiers on them.
Privacy guarantee of Masked Data Generation
There are two aspects of a data publishing algorithm. First,
we need to guarantee that the algorithm is -private. In par-
ticular, is the algorithm sensitive to the existence of a single
sample in two datasets that are different only at that sam-
ple? Second, we would like to assess how the utility of the
published dataset changes with changing . The following
Proposition answers the first question.
Proposition 1 If ||xi|| ≤ 1,∀i, then Algorithm 1 is -
private.
Utility of Masked Data Generation with changing 
We next consider the utility aspect of the masked dataset
O with different values of . We consider the utility of the
published data to be how well the classifier trained on the
published data is close to the classifier trained on the original
data.
Let us suppose that training logistic regression on the
original dataset Dtrain and the masked dataset O gives us
parameters w and w′, respectively. We are interested in
comparing the 0/1 risk (Vapnik and Vapnik 1998) of the
classifier trained on masked data (w′), to the 0/1 risk of
the classifier trained on original data (w). Note that logistic
regression is classification calibrated (Bartlett, Jordan, and
McAuliffe 2006), which means that minimizing the negative
log-likelihood leads to minimizing the 0/1 risk. Thus, it is
sufficient to compare the log-likelihood Lλ of w′ compared
to that of w.
Proposition 2 With probability 1− δ, Lλ(w′)− Lλ(w) ≤
1
2 (
2d log( dδ )
λN )
2(λ+ 1).
From Lemma 2, the classifier trained on masked data im-
proves when N is larger.
DPDP by Input Perturbation
In this section, we consider a classical and natural algo-
rithm to publish data (Sarwate and Chaudhuri 2013; Mivule
2012). The algorithm is quite simple: it directly adds noise
η ∼ e−||η||2 to each input sample. The detailed algorithm
is shown in Algorithm 2. Similar to Algorithm 1, in the rest
of this section we consider the privacy and the utility of the
input perturbation algorithm when  changes.
Privacy guarantee of Input Perturbation
We first show that Algorithm 2 is -private.
Proposition 3 If ||xi|| ≤ 1,∀i, then algorithm 2 is -private.
Algorithm 2 Input Perturbation
Input: N training samples Dtrain = {xk}Nk=1, 
Output: N masked training samples O = {x′k}Nk=1
while k < N do
η ∼ e−||η||2
x′k = xk + η
k = k + 1
end while
Return O = {x′k}Nk=1
Utility of Input Perturbation with changing 
Similar to Section , we consider the log-likelihood of the
classifier w′ trained on perturbed data. We are going to
bound the log-likelihood w.r.t. the original data Lλ(w′) −
Lλ(w). We begin with the following Proposition.
Lemma 4 (Chaudhuri and Monteleoni 2009). LetG(w) be
a convex function and g(w) be a function with ||∇g(w)|| ≤
g1 and minvminw ||vT∇2(G + g)(w)v|| ≥ G2. Let w =
argminG(w) and w′ = argminG(w) + g(w). Then
||w′ −w|| ≤ g1G2 .
Proposition 5 With probability 1− δ, Lλ(w′)− Lλ(w) ≤
1
2 (
2d log dδ
λ )
2(λ+ 1).
From Proposition 5, the classifier trained on perturbed data
does not improve when N is larger, as we see in Proposi-
tion 2.
Experiments
We compare the performance of our Masked Data Genera-
tion method in Algorithm 1 to the Input Perturbation method
in Algorithm 2, on both synthetic and real datasets.
Results on toy data
Datasets: In this section, the effectiveness of the pro-
posed method is illustrated on a 2D toy dataset. We sam-
ple 100 training samples from three normal distributions.
The 1st class comes fromN ([0; 1.5]T , 0.25I), the 2nd class
comes fromN ([1; 1]T , 0.25I), and the 3rd class comes from
N ([1;−1]T , 0.25I), as shown in Fig. 2(a). Assume that
samples from the 3rd class is sensitive.
Setting: We initialize the samples in the masked dataset
from a class with a different manifold for the 3rd class.
In particular, we first add to the published dataset a fake
class 3 with a totally different distribution manifold from
the original class 3, e.g., N ([2; 2]T , 0.25I) instead of
N ([1;−1]T , 0.25I), as shown in Fig. 2(b). We then run
the masked data generation method with non-empty train-
ing samples set S as in Algorithm 1.
Results: The samples generated from the proposed method
are shown in Fig. 2(c). From Fig. 2(c), to accommodate for
the shift in distribution manifold of class 3 from [2; 2] to
[1;−1], many other fake samples of class 3 are added in the
bottom of Fig. 2(c).From Fig. 2(c), we observe the useful-
ness of regularization, since less masked samples are on the
boundary. From Fig. 2(c) and Fig. 2(a), the generated sam-
ples from class 3 is significantly different from the origi-
nal true samples from class 3, which implies that the data
is private. However, the resulting classifier or the boundary
learned from the three classes are almost similar for origi-
nal data and published data. As a result, users are still able
to access original real data from classes 1 and 2, and at the
same time achieve the classifier for class 3 which is private
now.
Results on MNIST digits data
In this section, we consider the effectiveness of the proposed
algorithm on the MNIST handwritten digit dataset.
Datasets: We use PCA to reduce the dimensionality of the
data to 25. Similar to the toy example, we select samples
from three digits, e.g., three digits {0, 1, 3} as in Fig. 3(a),
and three digits {0, 1, 4} as in Fig. 4(a). The correspond-
ing classifier learned from three digits {0, 1, 3} is shown
in Fig. 3(d), and from three digits {0, 1, 4} is shown in
Fig. 4(d). 2 From those figures, e.g., in Fig. 3(d), the vi-
sualized classifier represents the three corresponding digits
{0, 1, 3}.
Setting: We first explain how to generate a non-empty ini-
tially masked training samples S in Algorithm 1. In partic-
ular, the first two digits from the initially masked training
samples are the same as the two digits of the original train-
ing samples. For example, we still uses samples from digits
0 and 1 for initially masked training samples as in Fig. 3(b).
However, for the last digit of the initially masked training
samples, we use a totally different digit from the last digit of
the true training samples. For example, we use digit 6 instead
of digit 3 as the last digit as in Fig. 3(b). The corresponding
classifier learned from the initially masked training samples
S is visualized in Fig. 4(e).
2For visualization of a classifier, e.g., in Fig. 3(d-f), we project
the classifier of each class back to the two dimensional space.
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Figure 2: (a) Original training samples, (b) Initially masked training samples, (c) Final masked samples using Algorithm 1
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Figure 3: (a) True training samples, (b) Initially masked samples in S, (c) Final masked samples using Algorithm 1, and their
corresponding w’s visualization (d-f) on MNIST datasets. We have digits from 0, 1, 3 and we would like to replace 3 with 6
using some fake samples.
2 2 2 3 3 1 1 3
1 1 3 1 1 2 2 2
(a) True training samples
3 1 3 1 1 1 3 2
2 1 2 3 3 2 2 1
(b) Initially masked samples set S
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
(c) Final masked samples using Algorithm 1
(d) True training w (e) Initially masked w (f) Masked w
Figure 4: (a) True training samples, (b) Initially masked samples in S, and (c) Final masked samples using Algorithm 1, and
their correspondingw’s visualization (d-f) on MNIST datasets. We have digits from 0, 1, 4 and we would like to replace 4 with
8 using some fake samples.
Result: We then iteratively add masked training samples
into S using the masked data generation method in Algo-
rithm 1. The masked samples generated by Algorithm 1 into
S are shown in Fig. 3(c). Note that several samples among
them remove the effect of digit 6, e.g., the 4th sample from
the left in the first row of Fig. 3(c). On another hand, several
among them add the effect of digit 3 back to the classifier,
e.g., the image at the bottom right of Fig. 3(c). Moreover,
because of the adding masked samples, the classifier learned
from the masked training samples is similar to the original
classifier learned from the original training samples. For ex-
ample, the classifier in Fig. 3(f) is similar to the classifier in
Fig. 3(d).
A similar visualization example is shown in Fig. 4,
where the original training samples are digit {0, 1, 4} as in
Fig. 4(a), the initially masked training samples in S are digit
{0, 1, 8} as in Fig. 4(b), and after generating masked sam-
ples, the classifier of the masked data as in Fig. 4(f) is similar
to the classifier of original data as in Fig. 4(d).
Results on UCI datasets
Datasets: We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
method on several UCI datasets in sensitive domains.
Evaluation Measure: For all datasets, we uniformly se-
lect a validation set V = {xi}nvali=1 of samples from two
classes. We denote the ground truth labels for these samples
as Ltrue. Using w′, the classifier trained on masked data,
we predict the labels for the validation set, namely Vmasked.
Then, we compute the accuracy ofw′ as the fraction of cases
where Vmasked matches Ltrue.
Setting: We consider the regularization parameter λ = 0.5.
Moreover, to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed
method and the input perturbation method when the num-
ber of training samples increases, we consider two cases:
N = 100 and N = 200. We vary the value of  in the
set {0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1, 2, . . . , 20, 50}, e.g., log-scale. For each
value of , we generate 50 training datasets, run the proposed
masked data generation Algorithm 1 and the input pertur-
bation Algorithm 2 on each dataset, then report the mean
and standard deviation accuracy of both algorithms. We
also evaluate the accuracy using the classifier after adding
Laplace noise, i.e., after Step 2 of Algorithm 1, which is
named as output perturbation.
Analysis: As shown in Fig. 5, first, as  increases, the accu-
racy of both methods increase. Additionally, for a particular
value of , the proposed method works better than input per-
turbation algorithm. Moreover, as N increases from 100 to
200, the proposed method gets higher accuracy for the same
value of . In contrast, the accuracy of the input perturbation
method does not change much as N increases. Furthermore,
note that the input perturbation method only updates the data
independently from the machine learning model. In contrast,
the data generated by the proposed method is directly tied to
the model, e.g., logistic regression with a particular value of
λ, which may lead to higher accuracy. Moreover, the perfor-
mance of the classifier trained on masked samples is com-
parable to those of the classifier trained on original training
samples then adding Laplace noise, i.e., after Step 2 of Algo-
rithm 1. The results indicate that the proposed masked data
generation Algorithm 1 is able to create masked samples
with corresponding classifier close to the perturbed classi-
fier.
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a data masking technique for
privacy-sensitive learning. The main idea is to iteratively
find masked data such that the gradient of the likelihood
on the classifier with regarding to the masked data is zero.
Our theoretical analysis showed that the proposed tech-
nique achieves higher utility compared to a traditional input
perturbation technique. Experiments on multiple real-world
datasets also demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed
method.
Appendices
Proof for Proposition 1. Assume there are two training
datasets D1 = {x1i}Ni=1 and D2 = {x2i}Ni=1, which are
different at only one sample. Without the loss of general-
ity, we assume x1i = x2i for i = {1, 2, . . . , N − 1},
and x1N 6= x2N . Assume the outputs of Algorithm 1 is
O = {x′1,x′2, . . . ,x′N}. Consider the ratio p(O|D1)p(O|D2) . We as-
sume that in Step 3 we can find the output O such that the
gradient of logistic regression objective w.r.t.w′ is exactly 0.
For the classifier in Step 2, we considerw′ = a1 for the first
datasetD1 andw′ = a2 for the second datasetD2. Using the
fact that the log-likelihood of logistic regression is convex,
and a1 and a2 are both optimal classifiers of the published
data O, thus a1 = a2 = a. Then, the ratio p(O|D1)p(O|D2) is com-
puted as:
p(O|D1)
p(O|D2) =
p(O|w′ = a)p(w′ = a|D1)
p(O|w′ = a)p(w′ = a|D2) =
p(w′ = a|D1)
p(w′ = a|D2) .
Assume w1 = b1 and w1 = b2 are the optimal classi-
fiers for D1 and D2 after Step 1. Therefore, because of
Laplace noise in Step 2, b1 + η1 = b2 + η2 = a ⇒
p(w′=a|D1)
p(w′=a|D2) =
p(η=η1)
p(η=η2)
= e−
λN
2 (||η1||−||η2||). Consequently,
p(O|D1)
p(O|D2) ≤ e
λN
2 (||b1||−||b2||) ≤ eλN2 (||b1−b2||). The sensitiv-
ity of logistic regression with N samples and regularization
parameter λ is atmost 2λN (Chaudhuri and Monteleoni
2009)⇒ p(O|D1)p(O|D2) ≤ e, which completes the proof.
Proof for Proposition 2. Since w′ is achieved from w
by adding Laplace noise, ||w′ − w|| is bounded. So,
Lλ(w′) − Lλ(w) is bounded using Taylor series. The rest
of the proof follows from Lemma 1 in (Chaudhuri and
Monteleoni 2009).
Proof for Proposition 3. Assume there are two training
datasets D1 = {x1i}Ni=1 and D2 = {x2i}Ni=1, which are
different at only one sample, e.g., without the loss of gen-
erality, we assume x1i = x2i for i = {1, 2, . . . , N − 1},
and x1N 6= x2N . Assume the outputs of of Algorithm 2 is
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(j) SpliceDNA
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Figure 5: The accuracy and privacy ( in log-scale) trade off for 12 benchmark datasets.
O = {x′1,x′2, . . . ,x′N−1,x′N}. Consider the ratio
p(O|D1)
p(O|D2) =
p(x′1|x1) . . . p(x′N−1|xN−1)p(x′N |x1N )
p(x′1|x1) . . . p(x′N−1|xN−1)p(x′N |x2N )
=
e−0.5||x
′
N−x1N ||
e−0.5||x′N−x2N ||
≤ e0.5||x1N−x2N || ≤ e,
where the last equation is from the fact that ||xi|| ≤ 1,∀i.
Thus, the input perturbation algorithm is -private.
Proof for Proposition 5. The proof is simi-
lar to (Chaudhuri and Monteleoni 2009). For the
sake of completeness, following Lemma 4, define
G(w) = H2(w)+λ
||w||2
2 and g = H
′
2(w)−H2(w), where
H
′
2(w) =
1
N
∑N
i=1
[(
yiw
Tx′i
) − log(∑Cl=1 ewTx′i)] and
H2(w) =
1
N
∑N
i=1
[(
yiw
Txi
) − log(∑Cl=1 ewTxi)].
Then, ||∇g|| = || 1N
[∑N
i=1
(
− (yi − p(yi =
1|xi,w)
)
x′i +
∑N
i=1
(
− (yi − p(yi = 1|xi,w)
)
xi
]
|| ≤
1
N
∑N
i=1 ||x′i − xi|| ≤ (N2d log dδ )/(N) = 2d log dδ /,
where the last inequality comes from the fact
||x′i − xi|| ∼ e
−||η||
2 and x′i, xi ∈ Rd. Note that
even though ||xi|| is upper bounded by 1 ∀i, ||x′i|| is
not upper bounded by 1 since x′i = xi + η where
η ∼ e−||η||2 . Hence, ||∇g|| can not be trivially upper
bounded by 2. Moreover, vT∇2(G + g)v is lower bounded
by λ. Thus, ||w′ − w|| ≤ 2d log dδλ . By Taylor expansion,
Lλ(w′) = Lλ(w) + ∇Lλ(w)(w′ − w) + 12 (w′ −
w)T∇2Lλ(w)(w′ −w) ≤ Lλ(w) + 12 ||w′ −w||2(λ+ 1).
This completes the proof.
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